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I focus on a challenge for epistemic ideals that I call the No-Paradise
Dilemma. According to it one ought and ought not to hold a specific be-
lief. The dilemma is seen to result from some initially plausible principles,
coupled with an assumption concerning our evidence about our cognitive
failures. Our evidence indicates that we are not in an epistemic paradise,
i.e. a state in which we do not experience cognitive failures. I opt for a
resolution of the dilemma that is based on an evidentialist position that
can be motivated independently of the dilemma and traces back to Conee
1994. I refer to the position as ‘the stability account of evidentialism’. Ac-
cording to this evidentialist position, it is rational for an agent to believe
a proposition on the agent’s total evidence just in case the proposition is
stably supported by the total evidence. Based on this evidentialist posi-
tion couched in terms of stable support, as well as my formal specification
of the position, I argue that it is not an epistemic ideal in the actual world
that we hold rational beliefs that are logically equivalent to our rational
beliefs. The dilemma is resolved by giving up this ideal for the actual
world and adopting the stability account of evidentialism.
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Imagine an epistemic paradise, but one in which the inhabitants are not omniscient. They
do not know everything already—a state which might after all be dreadfully boring—and
they still want to figure out things about the world. However, the inhabitants are logi-
cally omniscient:1 they believe all logically true propositions and disbelieve all logically
false propositions. And if they hold a rational belief, they also hold all logically equiv-
alent beliefs.2 They believe all the logical consequences of their rational beliefs, that is,
their belief set is logically closed. Furthermore, their beliefs are always properly based on
their total evidence. And on top of all that, in this epistemic paradise they have perfect
self-knowledge about their own doxastic states. This paradise is lost—or perhaps it never
existed. Nevertheless, in epistemology we still theorize about aspects of it. We theorize
about epistemic ideals;3 and we do so in the hope that we can thereby illuminate the notion
of ideal epistemic rationality, and as a further outcome learn something about epistemic
rationality in general. We theorize about epistemic ideals, for instance, when we take the
ideals as reference points for our judgements of rationality.4 Epistemic ideals have been
challenged for being cognitively too demanding, or for not taking self-doubt into account.5
In this paper, I focus on a challenge for epistemic ideals that is rooted in the fact that
we have evidence about our cognitive failures. I present the No-Paradise Dilemma, which
makes use of such evidence: evidence which suggests that we are not in epistemic paradise.
According to the dilemma one ought and ought not believe a specific proposition. I resolve
the dilemma by arguing that it is not an epistemic ideal in the actual world that we hold
rational beliefs that are logically equivalent to our rational beliefs. This resolution is based
1Here I am assuming that logical omniscience concerns both knowledge and rational belief.
2Throughout the article I only consider the epistemic dimension, so I often leave out the qualification
‘epistemic’ when referring to rationality.
3For an instructive discussion of epistemic idealizations in epistemology, see Yap 2014.
4See, similarly, Christensen 2004.
5For challenges of the latter kind, see e.g. Christensen 2007, 2010, and Smithies 2016.
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on an evidentialist position that traces back to Conee 1994, and for which I provide a formal
specification.6 I refer to this position as ‘the stability account of evidentialism’. According
to this evidentialist position, it is rational for an agent to believe a proposition on the
agent’s total evidence if and only if the proposition is stably supported by the evidence for
the agent. And the total evidence stably supports a proposition for the agent—roughly—
just in case the proposition remains supported by the total evidence for the agent, even by
the total evidence of the agent after believing the proposition in question and when the
agent believes the proposition.
I proceed as follows: in Section 2, I introduce the No-Paradise Dilemma. In Section 3,
after discussing possible resolutions to the dilemma, I opt for a resolution that is based on
the stability account of evidentialism. Based on this evidentialist position, for which I give
a formal specification, I argue against the epistemic ideal that we hold rational beliefs that
are logically equivalent to our rational beliefs.7 By giving up this ideal for the actual world
and adopting the evidentialist position in terms of stable evidential support, the dilemma
can be resolved in a plausible way.8 I summarize my results in Section 4.
6See also my paper Eder 2020 for this position, where I present it in an informal way.
7Christensen 2007 and Conee 1994 also question such an ideal. Unfortunately there is no room here to
compare their approaches to mine. However, I say a little bit on their approaches in Footnote 22 and 23.
8Smithies (2016: 416) writes the following about the standards for ideal and non-ideal agents:
Ideal standards require that one is perfectly responsive to the logical facts, and hence that
one is never mistaken or uncertain about logic. But since non-ideal agents cannot satisfy these
ideal standards, we can evaluate them by non-ideal standards of rationality that take their
limited capacities into consideration. These non-ideal standards sometimes require non-ideal
agents to depart from ideal standards by being uncertain or mistaken about logic. (Smithies
2016: 416)
Although I agree with this in spirit, I think that it is better not to speak of ideal agents, arguing in Eder
2019 that we should avoid reference to them. Comparing Smithies’s approach concerning idealizations to
mine is beyond the scope of the present paper. However, I’ll say a bit on his approach towards evidentialism
and rationality in Section 3.2.
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2 The No-Paradise Dilemma
Our notion of rationality is normative. When we say that it is rational for an agent
to believe a proposition we often also intend to say that the agent ought to believe the
proposition. This is sometimes so even in case the agent is not cognitively able to form the
respective belief. In such cases, ‘ought’ is used to express what would be ideal, disregarding
whether this ideal can be cognitively achieved by the agent. I follow Christensen, who says:
Clearly, we don’t want to blame anyone for failing to live up to an unattainable
ideal. But there are certainly evaluative notions that are not subject to ‘ought’-
implies-‘can’. I would argue that our ordinary notion of rationality is one of
them: when we call a paranoid schizophrenic ‘irrational’, we in no sense imply
that he has the ability to do better. (Christensen 2007: 5)
In this paper, I have this idealized notion of rationality in mind. We may refer to the notion
as ‘ideal rationality’ if preferred, but for simplicity I use the unqualified term ‘rationality’
and leave out ‘ideal’ unless it is required for clarity. The No-Paradise Dilemma arises
when one combines certain epistemic principles—which are commonly considered to be
epistemic ideals—with an assumption concerning our evidence about our cognitive failures.
In the following, I present the principles and the assumption concerning our evidence, and
show how they lead to the dilemma. The dilemma evolves from Williamson’s (2000)
argument against credence interpretations of evidential probabilities and my (Eder 2019)
reconstruction and criticism of the argument. It is, however, crucially different to both, as
those familiar with Williamson 2000 and my Eder 2019 will perceive, and as I discuss in
more detail at the end of Section 2.
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2.1 Evidentialism, Propositional and Doxastic Rationality
In this paper, I adopt an evidentialist position and distinguish between two kinds of ra-
tionality: propositional rationality and doxastic rationality. To begin with, I adopt the
following evidentialist position:
Propositional Rationality It is propositionally rational for an agent s to believe a
proposition p on s’s total evidence tev(s) just in case p is supported by tev(s) for s.
Formally: PRs(p,tev(s))↔ Ss(p,tev(s)).
I specify neither what evidence is nor the nature of the evidential support relation; for my
core argument an intuitive understanding of both will suffice. However, note that I disre-
gard inconsistent total evidence and I assume that the following minimal conditions hold
for evidence and evidential support: evidence is understood as a proposition, and when an
agent’s total evidence supports a proposition (i.e. is evidence for the proposition), then the
proposition is more plausible, given the evidence, than its negation is, given the evidence.
Sometimes we do not believe what is supported by our total evidence. Sometimes agents
don’t believe propositions even when it is propositionally rational for them to believe the
propositions (on their total evidence). And even when the agents believe the proposi-
tions, sometimes the beliefs are not properly based on their total evidence—which is, for
example, the case when the agents disregard some relevant pieces of evidence. This has
led epistemologists to bring doxastic rationality into the picture, commonly understood as
follows:9
Doxastic Rationality An agent s holds a doxastically rational belief in a proposition p
given s’s total evidence tev(s) just in case s believes p and s’s belief in p is properly
9See Smithies 2016: 405 for, at first glance, a similar understanding of propositional and doxastic
rationality. I say more on Smithies on propositional and doxastic rationality in Section 3.2.
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based on tev(s).
Formally: DRs(p,tev(s))↔ Bs(p) ∧ PBs(p,tev(s))
There is no room here to dig deep into the debate on when an agent’s belief is properly
based on the agent’s total evidence. What I shall argue for is neutral with respect to the
right understanding of this relation. In this paper, again, an intuitive understanding of it
will suffice.
To elucidate both kinds of rationality—propositional and doxastic—let us consider the
following two cases where propositional and doxastic rationality come apart. Think of a
scientist whose total evidence supports that the measles vaccine is safe. Given Proposi-
tional Rationality it is propositionally rational for the scientist to believe that the measles
vaccine is safe. Unfortunately, the scientist does not believe that the measles vaccine is
safe. As a consequence, the scientist does not hold a doxastically rational belief in the
proposition, because the scientist does not even hold a belief in the proposition. Or, al-
ternatively, it is propositionally rational for the scientist to believe the proposition that
the measles vaccine is safe and the agent actually believes that the measles vaccine is safe,
but the scientist believes that only because to believe otherwise would make the scientist
unpopular in the scientist’s scientific community. In this latter case, the belief that the
measles vaccine is safe is not doxastically rational either, because the belief is not properly
based on the scientist’s total evidence.
Even though propositional and doxastic rationality can come apart, it is often assumed
that there is a tight connection between them. According to the notion of propositional
and doxastic rationality that I advocate, it is excluded that it is propositionally rational
for an agent to believe a proposition on the agent’s total evidence but the evidence makes
it impossible for the agent to have a doxastically rational belief in the proposition. For
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example, the following is excluded: on your total evidence, it is propositionally rational for
you to believe a proposition that is a logical truth, and at the same time it is impossible that
you should have a doxastically rational belief in the proposition because of your higher-
order evidence that is included in your total evidence, where this higher-order evidence
prevents you from properly basing your belief in the logical truth on your total evidence.10
Such higher-order evidence could be evidence that a pill in the coffee you drank would likely
cause you to make mistakes when forming a belief.11 According to the understanding of
propositional and doxastic rationality in focus here, there is a tight link between these
kinds of rationality. With Christensen, I think that something like the following ‘is behind
our idea of propositional rationality’:
in general, the propositions that are rational for an agent to believe, given
certain evidence, are those that would be believed as part of an ideally rational
doxastic response to that evidence. (Christensen 2018)
Accordingly, the tight link between propositional and doxastic rationality is reflected in the
case in which things are ideal. Let’s assume that the belief being part of an ideally rational
doxastic response amounts to the belief being properly based. Then, Christensen’s consid-
erations in the quotation, I think, suggest the following bridge principle, which connects
propositional and doxastic rationality:
Bridge It is propositionally rational for an agent s to believe a proposition p on s’s total
evidence tev(s) just in case it ought to be the case that s holds a doxastically rational
belief in p given tev(s).
Formally: PRs(p,tev(s))↔ O[DRs(p,tev(s))]
10Regarding the assumption of a close connection between propositional and doxastic rationality, I follow
Christensen 2018.
11Smithies (2015, 2016) presents an interesting and appealing account that allows that propositional
and doxastic rationality can come apart in such cases. The pill-example here traces back to Christensen’s
(2010: 187) famous drug example.
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It is thereby relevant to keep in mind that ‘ought’ is used to express what would be
epistemically ideal, disregarding whether the agent in question has the cognitive abilities
to achieve the ideal. Accordingly, ‘ought’ or ‘ought to be the case that’ is applied to
propositions, which should be understood as describing ideal states. This is how ‘ought’
or ‘ought to be the case that’ is often understood, especially in standard deontic logic.
2.2 Logical Equivalence
One of the epistemic ideals that is widespread in epistemology, and especially in formal
epistemology, is logical omniscience; the epistemic ideal that we hold rational beliefs that
are logically equivalent to our rational beliefs is related to this. It is assumed that if two
propositions are logically equivalent, then it is ideal for an agent to hold a doxastically
rational belief in a proposition given the agent’s total evidence just in case the agent holds
a doxastically rational belief in the proposition’s equivalent proposition given the same
evidence. The following is in accordance with this:12
Logical Equivalence If a proposition p and a proposition q are logically equivalent, then
it ought to be the case that an agent s holds a doxastically rational belief in p given
s’s total evidence tev(s) just in case s holds a doxastically rational belief in q given
tev(s).
Formally: (p ⊧ q)→ O[DRs(p,tev(s))↔ DRs(q,tev(s))]
Logical Equivalence is commonly considered to be an epistemic ideal and it reflects what
would hold in epistemic paradise.
12See Williamson 2000: 210 for an analogous principle.
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2.3 No Belief in Moore-Paradoxical Propositions
Having focused on an epistemic ideal that concerns logical relations among beliefs, let us
turn to an ideal that concerns beliefs about oneself. Many epistemologists agree that it is
ideal not to believe Moore-paradoxical propositions of the form: p and I don’t believe p.
This kind of Moore-paradoxical proposition is of the omissive form. In the literature, one
distinguishes Moore-paradoxical propositions of the omissive form, which have the form p
and I don’t believe p, and Moore-paradoxical propositions of the commissive form, which
have the form: p and I believe not-p.13 One can also find discussions of propositions that are
like Moore-paradoxical propositions of the mentioned forms except that they are expressed
not merely in terms of belief but in terms of evidential support, knowledge, rationality (of
believing), etc.14 While it might be controversial whether one can hold doxastically ratio-
nal beliefs in Moore-paradoxical propositions of the commissive form or some other forms
in terms of evidential support, knowledge, rationality, etc., most epistemologists think that
beliefs in Moore-paradoxical propositions of the omissive form are never doxastically ra-
tional. That said, I set aside Moore-paradoxical propositions of the commissive form or
some other forms in terms of evidential support, knowledge, rationality, etc. In this paper,
I am not concerned with Moore-paradoxical propositions in general; hence I do not focus
on whether, and if so why, beliefs in other kinds of Moore-paradoxical propositions can be
doxastically rational. My focus is on a specific dilemma that arises from an assumption
about our evidence together with a combination of principles, one in terms of a specific
Moore-paradoxical proposition. To discuss the dilemma, and resolve it, I can put other
Moore-paradoxical propositions on one side.
In the literature one finds different motivations for thinking that it is ideal not to hold
13For the omissive-/commissive-form distinction, see for example Smithies 2016.
14See for example Lasonen-Aarnio 2019.
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beliefs in Moore-paradoxical propositions of the omissive form. I think it is safe to say
that the following two belong among the most popular motivations.15 They go roughly
as follows: first, it is assumed that it is ideal to have self-knowledge such that an agent
is aware of the agent’s beliefs in a proposition p and by doing so does not believe I don’t
believe p. And since the agent does not believe one of the conjuncts, the conjunction p
and I don’t believe p is not believed by the agent either. Second, as is well-known it is
impossible to know Moore-paradoxical propositions of the omissive form16, and, since it
is impossible, one cannot hold a doxastically rational belief in such propositions. It is
impossible to know such propositions, because by believing them they become false. They
are so-called self-destroying. One’s belief in p and I don’t believe p cannot be true. By
believing p the belief that I don’t believe p becomes false. The belief in the conjunction p
and I don’t believe p can never be true and so can never be known. It is thus not rational
to believe it.17 It is ideal not to believe Moore-paradoxical propositions.
The same applies to the proposition p and no one believes p. Thus, I accept the following:18
No Moore-Paradoxical Belief It ought to be the case that agent s does not believe
the proposition p and no one believes p.
Formally: O[¬Bs(p ∧ ¬∃s′Bs′(p))]
p and no one believes p is not strictly speaking a Moore-paradoxical proposition of the
omissive form (i.e. p and I don’t believe p). However, a moment’s reflection reveals that
the mentioned motivations for thinking that one cannot hold doxastically rational beliefs in
Moore-paradoxical propositions of the omissive form can be applied to Moore-paradoxical
15See Smithies 2016 for a detailed discussion of motivations.
16For the most prominent explanation for why it is impossible to know Moore-paradoxical propositions
of the omissive form, see Williamson 2000: 253f.
17See Smithies 2016 (Sect. 2.4) for this second kind of motivation. He attributes such a motivation to
Williamson 2000: 253f.
18Again, see Williamson 2000: 210 for an analogous principle.
11
propositions of the form p and no one believes p as well. In this paper, I assume that the
epistemic ideal No Moore-Paradoxical Belief holds. Things might be different with respect
to other forms of Moore-paradoxical propositions.
2.4 Your Total Evidence
Nothing I have said so far is incompatible with us being in epistemic paradise. Now, how-
ever, having presented evidentialist principles with respect to propositional rationality (i.e.
Propositional Rationality) and doxastic rationality (i.e. Doxastic Rationality), portrayed
the relation among these kinds of rationality (i.e. Bridge), and introduced two epistemic
ideals (i.e. Logical Equivalence and No Moore-Paradoxical Belief ), it is time to look at the
actual world, which is inhabited by humans—us. Once we focus on ourselves, we promptly
recognize that we are not in epistemic paradise. It is uncontroversial that our present
evidence supports that there are some logically true propositions, very complex ones, that
we, human agents, do not believe. We have evidence of our cognitive failures. Assume
that a is such a logical truth, b that no one believes a, and you are s∗. The following is
unquestionable:19
Your Total Evidence b is supported by your total evidence tev(s∗) for you, s∗.
Formally: Ss∗(b,tev(s∗))
With this assumption in place we can now present what I refer to as the No-Paradise
Dilemma.
2.5 The Dilemma
From Propositional Rationality, Doxastic Rationality, Bridge, Logical Equivalence, No Moore-
Paradoxical Belief, and Your Total Evidence one can derive the No-Paradise Dilemma:
19And again, see Williamson 2000: 210 for an analogous principle.
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Conclusion/No-Paradise Dilemma It ought to be the case that you, s∗, believe the
proposition p and no one believes p while at the same time it also ought to be the
case that you do not believe it.
Formally: O[Bs∗(a ∧ b)] ∧ O[¬Bs∗(a ∧ b)]
According to the conclusion, you ought and ought not to believe a specific proposition,
and this puts you in a dilemma. The conclusion can be shown by the following derivation:
1. PRs(p,tev(s))↔ Ss(p,tev(s)) Propositional Rationality
2. DRs(p,tev(s))↔ Bs(p) ∧ PBs(p,tev(s)) Doxastic Rationality
3. PRs(p,tev(s))↔ O[DRs(p,tev(s))] Bridge
4. (p ⊧ q)→ O[DRs(p,tev(s))↔ DRs(q,tev(s))] Logical Equivalence
5. O[¬Bs(p ∧ ¬∃s′Bs′(p))] No Moore-Paradoxical Belief
6. Ss∗(b,tev(s∗)) Your Total Evidence
7. PRs∗(b,tev(s∗)) 1. and 6.
8. O[DRs∗(b,tev(s∗))] 3. and 7.
9. O[DRs∗(a ∧ b,tev(s∗))] 4. and 8.
10.O[Bs∗(a ∧ b,) ∧ PBs∗(a ∧ b,tev(s∗))] 2. and 9.
11.O[Bs∗(a ∧ b,)] 10.
12.O[¬Bs∗(a ∧ b)] 5. (recall b is the proposition
that no one believes a)
∴ O[Bs∗(a ∧ b)] ∧ O[¬Bs∗(a ∧ b)] 11. and 12.
It is well known that evidentialist positions such as Propositional Rationality can stand
in conflict with Moore-paradoxical propositions. However, this formally precise derivation
of the No-Paradise Dilemma illuminates the exact structure of the present problem by
formally specifying the principles, assumptions, and the dilemma. This makes it easier to
resolve the latter. Here I won’t take a stand on whether there are epistemic dilemmas that
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cannot be resolved. However, I think that one should try one’s best to avoid dilemmas
and to look for possibilities to resolve them. As it turns out, the present dilemma can be
resolved. In the following section, I show how.
Before I proceed to resolve the No-Paradise Dilemma, I would like to roughly compare my
approach here with Williamson’s (2000) and mine in Eder 2019. As I mentioned earlier,
the dilemma evolves from Williamson’s (2000: Sect. 10.1) argument against credence in-
terpretations of evidential probabilities and my (Eder 2019) reconstruction and criticism
of the argument.
A crucial difference is that Williamson’s argument concerns interpretations of evidential
probabilities, credences, and ideal agents, while the assumption about our evidence that
lead to the No-Paradise-Dilemma, the principles, and the dilemma itself concern none of
these. The latter concern categorical beliefs, propositional and doxastic rationality, and
epistemic normativity. In particular, whereas Williamson’s argument focuses on the cre-
dences of ideal agents, I frame my argument in normative terms, in terms of what one ought
to believe, and I focus on the connection between propositional and doxastic rationality.
In more detail, both Williamson’s argument and my derivation of the dilemma do in part
rely on similar principles. Principles like Logical Equivalence and No Moore-Paradoxical
Belief are well-known assumptions in the literature, and Williamson and I merely use
different versions of these principles in line with our different foci. In addition, I adopt
Your Total Evidence from an ingenious assumption by Williamson that is analogous to it.
However, the No-Paradise Dilemma, Propositional Rationality, Doxastic Rationality, and
Bridge, play no role at all in Williamson 2000 or my Eder 2019 not even in an analogous
way. Note, furthermore, that a comparison between the approaches in his 2000 and my
14
2019, and my approach here, requires a thorough examination of how rational categorical
belief and rational credences are related. Since there is no room for such an examination
here, I must leave it to another occasion.
3 A Resolution
In the following, I introduce two ways to resolve the dilemma. The first consists of revising
Bridge by restricting it to certain kinds of evidence. The second, more attractive, way con-
sists of revising Propositional Rationality and rejecting Logical Equivalence as a principle
for the actual world but keeping the other principles untouched. I opt for the latter way.
3.1 Revising Bridge
As mentioned before, I assume that there is a tight connection between propositional
and doxastic rationality. To reject a principle such as Bridge once and for all is not an
option. However, one might revise Bridge by restricting it to total evidence that does
not support that we commit cognitive failures such as not believing logical truths. A
moment’s reflection makes clear that one can thereby block the derivation of the No-
Paradise Dilemma. However, the revised Bridge principle would then be very restrictive in
nature. It would not be very helpful outside epistemic paradise, where our total evidence
supports that there are logical truths that are not believed by us. Even if such a restricted
principle is correct, an unrestricted principle would be preferable. Let’s keep looking. As it
will turn out, Propositional Rationality is a good candidate for a principle that we should
revise.
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3.2 My Specification of the Stability Account of Evidentialism
In this subsection I present my specification of what I call ‘the stability account of ev-
identialism’. I propose to revise Propositional Rationality in terms of stable evidential
support, and in the subsequent subsections I show why the revision of Propositional Ratio-
nality leads to giving up the epistemic ideal Logical Equivalence for the actual world and
so resolving the No-Paradise Dilemma.
I propose a revision of Propositional Rationality, which traces back to Conee 1994. This re-
vision together with a specification of stable evidential support amount to my specification
of the stability account of evidenitalism. The revised principle is not motivated merely by
the need to provide a solution to the No-Paradise Dilemma. More precisely, the principle is
motivated by considerations that are independent of Moore-paradoxical propositions. This
has the advantage that my resolution of the dilemma is not simply a piecemeal solution
to a philosophical problem. The principle is not just an ad hoc hypothesis, but sits at the
centre of a theory of rationality that is robustly applicable to various cases of so-called
self-destroying propositions.
To see that the revision of Propositional Rationality is appealing independently of the
dilemma let’s put the dilemma on one side for a moment. The following example shows
the limits of Propositional Rationality regardless of the No-Paradise Dilemma:
Footrace Example ‘I can have adequate evidence for believing that I will
win a footrace in a situation in which, if I believed I will win, I would become
overconfident, acquire evidence of the overconfidence, and thereby cease to have
adequate evidence that I will win. When we are in this kind of situation, we
can seem to be in an epistemic dilemma’ (Odegard 1993: 161).
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In the example, a dilemma arises because by believing the proposition that one will win
the footrace the proposition, which is supported by the evidence is not supported anymore.
Considering such examples, Conee says the following:
Instrumental considerations aside, it is impossible for us to have epistemic
reason to believe something that we know would not be supported by the
balance of our evidence when we would believe it. When believing would result
in a loss of crucial evidence for the believed proposition, adopting the belief
would not bring about knowledge of the proposition. Foreseeing this sort of
loss excludes having an epistemic reason to believe when contemplating the
proposition. (Conee 1994: 478)
Conee’s observation above leads us in the right direction. However, let’s put the diagnosis
of the problem a little differently. What goes wrong in Footrace Example is not that one
loses ‘crucial evidence’ but that the evidential support for the target proposition (i.e. that
one will win the footrace) is not stable; where I understand ‘stable’ in the sense that—
roughly—the proposition remains supported by the total evidence for the agent, even by the
total evidence of the agent after believing the proposition in question and when the agent
believes the proposition. Conee does not phrase his position in terms of the instability of
the evidential support relation, nor does be present a formal specification of his position,
but shortly after the comments quoted above he makes a claim that suggests that he thinks
that ‘the quality of one’s evidence for a proposition’ is diminished or weakened by believing
the proposition in question in cases such as Footrace Example (Conee 1994: 478). And this
is exactly the case when the evidential support for a proposition is not stable. One loses
the evidential support for the proposition that one will win the footrace as soon as one
believes the very same proposition. This is also in accordance with the following quotation
by Conee:
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there is the conditional fact that a considered proposition is supported by ev-
idence which would be adequate for knowing the proposition, but only if the
quality of the evidence were undiminished upon adoption of the belief. This
sort of fact on its own is not an epistemic reason to believe the proposition.
Coming to believe such a proposition usually constitutes coming to know it,
since usually the quality of one’s evidence for a proposition is not weakened
by believing it. But if we are in the peculiar situation in question, then we
foresee that believing would be accompanied by a decisive deterioration in our
evidence for the truth of the belief. (Conee 1994: 478)
According to evidentialist positions, what is rational to believe and which beliefs are ratio-
nal depends on—or is even determined by—the evidential support provided to them. What
indeed makes evidentialist positions attractive is that the available evidence can indicate
the truth of a proposition in question. If there is such an indicator, it stands to reason
that it is rational to believe the proposition, which then, given the indicator, is plausibly,
or likely, to be true. However, this attractiveness disappears when the support is not sta-
ble, when the support vanishes once one forms the belief in the proposition in question.
Support that vanishes in this way turns out to be superfluous. Thus, I suggest that for
propositional rationality to hold, mere evidential support does not suffice. The support
has to be stable. Unstable support is unusual, which is in line with what Conee claims
above. However, due to examples such as Footrace Example, a stability requirement must
be added. The following revised version of Propositional Rationality takes this requirement
into account:
Propositional Rationality* It is propositionally rational for an agent s to believe a




I specify stable evidential support as follows:
Stable Evidential Support p is stably supported by tev(s) for s just in case p is sup-
ported by tev(s) for s and p is also supported for s by the conjunction that consists of
the conjunct that s believes p and s’s total evidence after believing that p ,tev(sBs(p)).
Formally: SESs(p,tev(s))↔ Ss(p,tev(s)) ∧ Ss(p,Bs(p) ∧ tev(sBs(p)))
Before I discuss the consequences of Propositional Rationality* for Logical Equivalence and
No Moore-Pradoxical Belief, let me clarify the following two things.
First, I assume that the agent’s total evidence after believing the proposition in question
(i.e. tev(sBs(p))) does not include that the agent does not believe the proposition. This
ensures that the conjunction Bs(p) ∧ tev(sBs(p)), which is supposed to support p, is not
inconsistent. For example, suppose the agent initially did not believe that p and on the
basis of introspective powers received higher-order evidence that she does not believe that
p. Then her initial total evidence together with Bs(p) would be inconsistent. For this
reason, we focus on the agent’s total evidence after believing the proposition in question
and assume that it is consistent with Bs(p).
Second, in this paper the focus is on rationally believing (or rational beliefs in) first-order
propositions about the world or about logical truths, and higher-order propositions of the
simplest form, namely, higher-order propositions about us believing or not believing such
first-order propositions. For this narrow focus the formalization of stable support is apt.
However, things might be more complicated when we consider other higher-order proposi-
tions, such as propositions about evidential relations, about basing our beliefs, and about
the epistemic statuses of our beliefs. For such propositions, one might need to revise Stable
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Evidential Support. I leave it to future research to provide a more comprehensive account
of stable evidential support. For the points I am going to make this is not necessary.
Smithies 2016: Sect. 2.6 defends a view that is similar to Conee’s and mine. His
propositional-/doxastic-rationality distinction is similar to that presented in Section 2.1
here. He says that ‘[w]ithin the framework of evidentialism, this is the distinction between
having evidence that makes it rational for one to believe a proposition and believing the
proposition in a way that is properly based on the evidence’ (Smithies 2016: 205). Consid-
ering (omissive) Moore-paradoxical propositions he introduces the conception of ‘finkish
evidence’. This is evidence that ‘is destroyed or undermined in the process of attempting
to form a doxastically rational belief that is properly based on the evidence’ (Smithies
2016: 205). Such a belief is a belief in propositions such as Moore-paradoxical propositions
or the proposition that one will win the footrace. Finkish evidence has as a consequence
that, in my terminology, the evidential support is unstable. Smithies (2016)—in contrast
to me—does not adopt a conception of propositional rationality in terms of stable evi-
dential support. Instead he claims that (omissive) Moore-paradoxical propositions can be
supported by one’s total evidence, and when they are they are propositionally rational,
but since they are supported by finkish evidence the belief in such propositions is not dox-
astically rational because one cannot base the belief properly on such evidence. He allows
for the case where there is propositional rationality on some total evidence although the
available evidence excludes that one can have the corresponding doxastically rational belief
based on the evidence. As mentioned in Section 2.1 here, I prefer a tight connection be-
tween propositional and doxastic rationality, where the evidence cannot exclude that there
is doxastic rationality given that there is corresponding propositional rationality. Smithies
(2016: 205f.) is aware that on his view the connection between propositional and doxastic
rationality is less close than others assume or demand.
20
3.3 Rejecting Logical Equivalence
Let’s focus on the implications of Propositional Rationality*. The requirement of stable
evidential support has important implications for our epistemic ideals, as I show in the
present and following subsections.
Given Propositional Rationality*, Logical Equivalence does not hold. Recall:
Logical Equivalence If a proposition p and a proposition q are logically equivalent, then
it ought to be the case that an agent s holds a doxastically rational belief in p given
s’s total evidence tev(s) just in case s holds a doxastically rational belief in q given
tev(s).
Formally: (p ⊧ q)→ O[DRs(p,tev(s))↔ DRs(q,tev(s))]
To show that Logical Equivalence does not hold, let’s consider the logical truth a and the
proposition b (i.e. the proposition that no one believes a), and let us revise Your Total
Evidence in terms of stable evidential support as follows:
Your Total Evidence* b is stably supported by your total evidence tev(s∗) for you, s∗.
Formally: SESs∗(b,tev(s∗))
Your Total Evidence* is uncontroversial. Your total evidence does not only support that
no one believes a, but it stably supports it. Believing that no one believes a (i.e. b) does
not have any influence on the truth-value of the proposition that no one believes a itself.
Things look different with respect to the logically equivalent proposition that a and no one
believes a (i.e. a∧ b). In the following, I explain why tev(s∗) does not stably support a∧ b
for you, s∗. tev(s∗) does not stably support a∧ b because for stable evidential support the
following conjunction Bs∗(a ∧ b) ∧ tev(s∗Bs∗(a∧b)) should also support a ∧ b. But s
∗ believes
that (a and no one believes a) and tev(s∗
Bs∗(a∧b)
)) does not support that (a and no one
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believes a):20 from s∗ believes that (a and no one believes a) and tev(s∗
Bs∗(a∧b)
)) it follows
that s∗ believes a.21 And this certainly contradicts that a and no one believes a. There-
fore, Bs∗(a ∧ b) ∧ tev(s∗Bs∗(a∧b)) contradicts a ∧ b and does not support it. I refer to this as
Analytical Truth. Analytical Truth establishes that tev(s∗) does not stably support a∧b for
s∗. As I show in the following, Analytical Truth leads to the rejection of Logical Equivalence:
1. PRs(p,tev(s))↔ SESs(p,tev(s)) Propositional Rationality*
2. PRs(p,tev(s))↔ O[DRs(p,tev(s))] Bridge
3. SESs∗(b,tev(s∗)) Your Total Evidence*
4. ¬SESs∗(a ∧ b,tev(s∗)) Analytical Truth
5. PRs∗(b,tev(s∗)) 1. and 3.
6. ¬PRs∗(a ∧ b,tev(s∗)) 1. and 4.
7. O[DRs∗(b,tev(s∗))] ∧ ¬O[DRs∗(a ∧ b,tev(s∗))] 2., 5., and 6.
8. O[DRs∗(b,tev(s∗))] ↮ O[DRs∗(a ∧ b,tev(s∗))] 7.
9. ¬O[DRs∗(b,tev(s∗)) ↔ DRs∗(a ∧ b,tev(s∗))] 8.
∴ (b ⊧ (a ∧ b)) ∧ ¬O[DRs∗(b,tev(s∗)) ↔ DRs∗(a ∧
b,tev(s∗))]
9.
This conclusion displays a counterexample to Logical Equivalence, which results from the
fact that although b and a ∧ b are logically equivalent, the former is stably supported by
your total evidence (i.e. tev(s∗)) while the latter is not.22
20I add the brackets to make the logical structure clear.
21I think it is safe to assume here that if one believes a conjunction, one believes each of the conjuncts
as well.
22When discussing the Footrace Example, Conee defends that “ideal thinkers” do not believe all logical
consequences of their beliefs nor equivalent beliefs. While this is in in accordance with my criticism of
Logical Equivalence. His discussion, which is different to mine, involves ideal thinkers and withholding
judgement. His defends is neither in terms of the stability of evidential support nor formal. Of course, it
doesn’t refer to my specification of the stability account of evidentialism.
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Although we have to give up Logical Equivalence in its unrestricted version, there is still
the possibility that Logical Equivalence holds in a restricted form.23 As mentioned before,
it is after all very uncommon that propositions that are supported by some evidence are
not stably supported by it. I leave it to another occasion to examine alternatives to Logical
Equivalence that are more restrictive in nature than Logical Equivalence.
3.4 Keeping No Moore-Paradoxical Belief
In contrast to Logical Equivalence, No Moore-Paradoxical Belief holds given Propositional
Rationality*. Recall, No Moore-Paradoxical Belief, claims the following:
No Moore-Paradoxical Belief It ought to be the case that agent s does not believe
the proposition p and no one believes p.
Formally: O[¬Bs(p ∧ ¬∃s′Bs′(p))]
As demonstrated before, your total evidence tev(s∗) does not stably support the Moore-
paradoxical proposition a and no one believes a (i.e. a ∧ b), and as a consequence it is not
propositionally rational for you, s∗, to believe a∧ b given tev(s∗). This can be generalized,
and does not only hold for you and your total evidence. Moore-paradoxical propositions
of the form p and no one believes p are never stably supported by any piece or body of
evidence. This suggests that in general one ought not to hold beliefs in Moore-paradoxical
propositions of the form p and no one believes p. No Moore-Paradoxical Belief holds.
3.5 Avoiding the No-Paradise Dilemma
Let’s review the original derivation that led to the Conclusion/No-Paradise Dilemma. Re-
call:
23Christensen (2007), who also challenges such an ideal but based on considerations about self-doubt,
seems to think that ideals such as Logical Equivalence still hold in a restricted form, under ceteris paribus
conditions.
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1. PRs(p,tev(s))↔ Ss(p,tev(s)) Propositional Rationality
2. DRs(p,tev(s))↔ Bs(p) ∧ PBs(p,tev(s)) Doxastic Rationality
3. PRs(p,tev(s))↔ O[DRs(p,tev(s))] Bridge
4. (p ⊧ q)→ O[DRs(p,tev(s))↔ DRs(q,tev(s))] Logical Equivalence
5. O[¬Bs(p ∧ ¬∃s′Bs′(p))] No Moore-Paradoxical Belief
6. Ss∗(b,tev(s∗)) Your Total Evidence
7. PRs∗(b,tev(s∗)) 1. and 6.
8. O[DRs∗(b,tev(s∗))] 3. and 7.
9. O[DRs∗(a ∧ b,tev(s∗))] 4. and 8.
10.O[Bs∗(a ∧ b,) ∧ PBs∗(a ∧ b,tev(s∗))] 2. and 9.
11.O[Bs∗(a ∧ b,)] 10.
12.O[¬Bs∗(a ∧ b)] 5. (recall b is the proposition
that no one believes a)
∴ O[Bs∗(a ∧ b)] ∧ O[¬Bs∗(a ∧ b)] 11. and 12.
By replacing Propositional Rationality with Propositional Rationality* and Your Total
Evidence with Your Total Evidence*, one can still derive, analogous to before, line 7 (from
1 and 6) and line 8 (from 3 and 7).24 However, since Logical Equivalence does not hold
we cannot derive line 9 from line 4 and line 8. In a further outcome, we cannot derive
the conclusion, i.e. the No-Paradise Dilemma. The dilemma is successfully resolved by
rejecting Logical Equivalence in a plausible way that is motivated independently of the
24Recall both:
Propositional Rationality* It is propositionally rational for an agent s to believe a proposition p on
s’s total evidence tev(s) just in case p is stably supported by tev(s) for s.
Formally: PRs(p,tev(s))↔ SESs(p,tev(s))
and
Your Total Evidence* b is stably supported by your total evidence tev(s∗) for you, s∗.
Formally: SESs∗(b,tev(s∗))
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No-Paradise Dilemma. This rejection is due to the fact that while b is stably supported
by your total evidence, the logically equivalent proposition a ∧ b is not.
4 Conclusion
After introducing the No-Paradise Dilemma I suggested a resolution of it by, first, suggest-
ing a specification of the stability account of evidentialism, which consists of the following
two components:
Propositional Rationality* It is propositionally rational for an agent s to believe a
proposition p on s’s total evidence tev(s) just in case p is stably supported by tev(s)
for s.
Formally: PRs(p,tev(s))↔ SESs(p,tev(s)).
Stable Evidential Support p is stably supported by tev(s) for s just in case p is sup-
ported by tev(s) for s and p is also supported for s by the conjunction that consists of
the conjunct that s believes p and s’s total evidence after believing that p ,tev(sBs(p)).
Formally: SESs(p,tev(s))↔ Ss(p,tev(s)) ∧ Ss(p,Bs(p) ∧ tev(sBs(p)))
In a second step I argued for rejecting the following epistemic ideal for the actual world:
Logical Equivalence If a proposition p and a proposition q are logically equivalent, then
it ought to be the case that an agent s holds a doxastically rational belief in p given
s’s total evidence tev(s) just in case s holds a doxastically rational belief in q given
tev(s).
Formally: (p ⊧ q)→ O[DRs(p,tev(s))↔ DRs(q,tev(s))]
By adopting Propositional Rationality* (and Stable Evidential Support) and rejecting Log-
ical Equivalence, it is no longer possible to derive the Conclusion/No-Paradise Dilemma.
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